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Performance effects of appointing other firms' executive directors to 
corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms. 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effect on company performance of appointing non-executive 
directors that are also executive directors in other firms. The analysis is based on a 
new panel dataset of UK companies over 2002-2008. Our results suggest a positive 
relationship between the presence of these non-executive directors and the 
accounting performance of the appointing companies. The effect is stronger if these 
directors are executive directors in firms that are performing well. We also find a 
positive effect where these non-executive directors are members of the audit 
committee. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the view that non-
executive directors that are executives in other firms contribute to both the 
monitoring and advisory functions of corporate boards. 
JEL: G34, G39 
Key words: executive directors, non-executive directors, company performance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The conflict of interest between managers on the one hand and providers of finance, 
most notably shareholders, on the other, is a key feature of the public corporation 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Among various corporate governance mechanisms, 
which aim to realign these interests, a prominent role is assigned to corporate 
boards (Nordberg 2011). The issues of board structure and processes, defined in 
terms of board size, the establishment of various committees, the separation of the 
posts of the chairman of the board and the CEO, and non-executive director 
independence and representation have been central to recent corporate governance 
debates and reforms throughout the globe. The UK is no exception in this respect. 
Since the Cadbury Report (1992) there have been significant changes to board 
structures in the UK. For example, McKnight and Weir (2009) show that duality, 
combining the posts of the chairman and the CEO, is now rare in UK quoted 
companies and Dayha et al. (2002) report a significant increase in the percentage of 
non-executive directors classified as independent. 
The importance afforded non-executive directors in national codes of corporate 
governance, including the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), suggests that 
these directors should exert a positive influence on company performance. This 
relationship has received considerable attention in empirical studies, for example 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Mura (2007) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) for the 
US and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) and Weir et al. (2002) for the UK. However, the 
results are mixed at best. As noted by Goergen (2012, p.282), “The existing 
empirical literature provides little support for the effectiveness of independent, non-
executive directors”. One reason to that may be the lack of attention to the intrinsic 
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heterogeneity among independent directors, defined along various dimensions, 
including professional experience. 
One important dimension is that some independent directors may also be executive 
directors in other companies (hereafter we will call these directors independent 
executive directors, IEDs). Indeed, a number of publicly quoted companies in the UK 
have boards that include non-executive directors that are simultaneously serving as 
executive directors on other boards.1 This may have several implications for the 
performance of appointing firms. On the one hand, a company appointing IEDs may 
benefit from their knowledge and experience, especially if these IEDs hold executive 
positions in firms from the same or similar industry. On the other hand, according to 
agency theory, there is a potential conflict of roles when the same person acts as an 
executive director for one company but as a non-executive director for another. 
Therefore IEDs may be a source of agency conflicts when acting as executive 
directors but a source of reduced agency costs when acting as non-executive 
directors. The impact of IEDs on the performance of the company appointing them 
as non-executive directors is therefore a non-trivial and important question. 
There is a very limited US literature that analyses the performance effects of having 
IEDs simultaneously sitting on different boards. Fich (2005) and Chen (2008) both 
report that IEDs have a positive effect on the appointing firm‟s performance which 
suggests that IEDs produce beneficial outcomes for the appointing firm. However, it 
                                                          
1
 An example is the Yule Catto report from 21 August 2007: “We are delighted to welcome Jez Maiden and 
Sandy Dobbie to the Yule Catto Board. They bring a wealth of business and chemical industry experience to our 
boardroom and we look forward to them playing an important part in the future development and strategic 
direction of the Group.”
1
 Importantly, at the time of this appointment Jez Maiden was also the chief finance 
officer of Northern Foods PLC.  
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is not clear that the findings from the US can be generalized to countries with 
different corporate governance systems, such as the UK.2 
This paper studies performance effects of appointing other firms' executive directors 
to corporate boards in the UK. Consistent with the explicit advantages associated 
with non-executive directors, as set out in the various UK corporate governance 
codes, our basic hypothesis maintains that, in the presence of director fixed effects, 
the appointment of an executive director as non-executive director will have a 
positive impact on the appointing company‟s performance. Our empirical analysis is 
based on a new rich panel dataset that is obtained by merging financial data from 
Extel Financial and director information from the Corporate Register over the period 
2002 to 2008.   
We believe this paper makes several contributions to the corporate governance 
literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first UK study of the impact 
on performance of appointing an executive director as a non-executive director. It 
therefore contributes to the debate about the heterogeneity of non-executive 
directors and its potential consequences for firm performance.  
Second, the corporate governance literature identifies two key roles of non-executive 
directors: monitoring the executive directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003), and 
providing advice to them (Coles et al. 2008 and Chen 2008). Although both roles are 
                                                          
2
There are important differences between the governance systems of the US and UK. For example, 
US corporate governance is based on a system of mandatory disclosure which involves a 
combination of state and federal laws, including the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and on the listing 
requirements of its various stock exchanges. In contrast, the UK‟s corporate governance system is 
based on a „comply or explain‟ approach. This requires firms to inform shareholders about the 
governance recommendations with which they have complied and to explain why any non-compliance 
has occurred. In addition, as Higgs (2003) points out, the US system has adopted an approach that 
requires more transparency and accountability, mainly the responsibility of the CEO, as well as a 
more independent board structure, than found in the UK. The impact of appointing an executive 
director as a non-executive director in the US and UK may therefore have different outcomes given 
the differing corporate governance systems in the two countries. 
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highlighted in the UK corporate governance codes, there are no UK studies that 
differentiate between them in relation to their impacts on company performance. This 
paper attempts to fill in this gap and add new insights into the impact of these types 
of non-executive director. 
Finally, in this paper we provide, by examining various interactions between the 
characteristics of the firms where IEDs hold executive and non-executive posts, a 
number of new insights into the importance of directors‟ human capital and its 
transferability across different industries.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, appointing a non-executive director 
that is already an executive director in another quoted company has a significant and 
positive impact on the accounting performance of the firm. Second, the positive 
impact on the performance of the non-executive director‟s firm is stronger the better 
the performance of the firm where the person is an executive director. We interpret 
these results as evidence that the director‟s human capital creates positive advisory 
outcomes for the appointing firm. Third, we find a positive relationship between the 
performance of the company and the IEDs‟ membership in its audit committee. This 
suggests a contribution of independent executives to the monitoring function of 
corporate boards. Finally, the results for the degree of industry similarity between the 
firms where the directors hold their posts are ambiguous. Industry similarity seems to 
magnify the contribution of IEDs to company performance only when the IEDs are 
members of the audit committee.    
The paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses the relevant literature and 
outlines the specific hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 sets out the data and the 
econometric modeling and Section 4 presents the data. The results are discussed in 
Section 5, and Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Agency theory argues that there are costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control in publicly held companies. The agency model proposes that 
non-executive directors are an effective means of monitoring executive directors and 
that they are able to change the behaviour of the executive directors so that 
shareholder interests are pursued (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Hermalin 
and Weisbach 2003). In addition, providing executive directors with advice may be 
another important part of a non-executive director‟s functions (Adams and Ferreira 
2007, Harris and Raviv 2008). Adams and Ferreira (2007) show that the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors at both monitoring and advising depends on 
the costs of gaining relevant information. There is also evidence that suggests the 
existence of a trade-off between the two roles. For example, Chen (2008) proposes 
that the cost of fulfilling the advisory function is a consequent reduction in monitoring 
effectiveness.  
The relationship between non-executive director representation and firm 
performance is subject to controversy and debate (Goergen 2012). A number of 
studies have found a positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive 
directors and company performance, for example, Weir at al. (2002) and Mura 
(2007). In contrast, others have reported a negative relationship, for example 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Bhagat and Black (2002), Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Carter et al. (2010). Others have found an insignificant relationship, for 
example, Mehran (1995) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000). Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) argue that the lack of a clear relationship between board composition and 
performance is explained by factors such as top management exercising control over 
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the board selection process and by boards concentrating more on monitoring 
extreme negative events while ignoring marginal underperforming. 
Further, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with a majority of their outside 
directors serving on three or more boards have lower profitability. Thus busy non-
executive directors may be over-committed and therefore unable to fulfil the role of 
effective monitors. In addition, Vafeas (2003) reports that longer outside director 
tenure adversely affects firm performance. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that the 
existence of substantial social ties between outside directors and top management 
diminishes the effectiveness of the monitoring role of non-executive directors.  
The Higgs Report (2003) into the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors in 
the UK highlighted the narrowness of the pool from which UK non-executive 
directors have been drawn, including the relative lack of executive directors that 
were also acting as non-executive directors. The report states that only around 7.2% 
of non-executive directors also served as executive directors. This is a cause for 
concern because, as Higgs argues, appointing firms could benefit from the 
experience gained by their non-executive directors in the executive post. This 
assumes that information is not costly for the non-executive director to acquire and 
that the director‟s human capital is transferrable to the non-executive role.  
The conjecture by Higgs (2003) that appointing non-executive directors who are 
executives in other firms may have positive performance effects has not, however, 
been tested in the UK. However, the limited US evidence suggests that IEDs indeed 
produce positive outcomes for the appointing firm. For example, Fich (2005) reports 
positive abnormal returns when the CEO of another firm is appointed as an 
independent director. Similarly, Chen (2008) finds a positive relationship between 
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independent directors that are also executive directors and firm performance. Our 
study provides an addition to this small but important literature based on new data 
from the UK.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL MODELING 
 
Our basic proposition is that firm performance is positively affected by the presence 
of a non-executive director that is also an executive director in another firm. This 
proposition can be substantiated as follows: undertaking the role of an executive 
director ceteris paribus implies the accumulation of managerial knowledge and skills 
that are likely be useful to the firm where the person works as non-executive director. 
These human capital characteristics can enhance both the monitoring and advisory 
functions of a corporate board and thus contribute positively to company 
performance. Therefore our first hypothesis is: 
H1: IEDs have a positive impact on firm performance. 
This basic hypothesis is set out in the first and simplest empirical model, in which we 
relate the performance of a company to the presence of independent executive 
directors on its board. In particular, we consider the following specification:  
PERFit = βIEit+Xitγ+δt+ξi+εit     (1) 
where i is the firm index, t is the time index, and PERFit stands for the performance 
of company i, variable IEit indicates the presence of a non-executive director that is 
also an executive director. Vector Xit contains a set of control variables which are 
traditionally included in studies of firm performance, δt is a time specific effect, ξi is a 
firm specific effect, which encompasses all unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
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of the firm potentially affecting its performance, and εit is a random disturbance. Of 
primary interest to us is the coefficient β on variable IEit. In accordance with our basic 
hypothesis, we expect β to be positive. 
We employ three different measures of performance: return on equity (ROE) which is 
defined as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by book value of 
shareholders‟ equity; return on sales (ROS), calculated as EBIT divided by total 
turnover; and Tobin‟s Q.3 The latter indicator is calculated as the ratio of the firm‟s 
market capitalization to book value of equity.4 We analyse the effect of IED using two 
definitions of variable IEit. First, we employ a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if at least one non-executive director is also an executive director of another 
company and 0 otherwise. Second, IEit is defined as the number of non-executive 
directors on the board who are also executive directors at other companies.  
The elements of vector Xit control for firm-specific characteristics that influence firm 
performance. The choice of our control variables is based on earlier studies of 
company performance in cross-sectional and panel data settings. To control for firm 
size, we include the natural log of the number of employees, log(Labourit) (Coles et 
al. 2008). The financial strength of a firm is measured by two variables, Liquidityit, 
defined as the ratio of cash holdings to total assets, Cashit/TAit (Baek et al. 2004), 
and Leverageit, calculated as ratio of long term debt over total assets (Weir et al. 
2002). In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problems, we lag all financial 
variables that appear on the right hand side of our regression models. Finally, to 
control for corporate governance characteristics we include in vector Xit the total 
                                                          
3
In addition to ROE and ROS, we have also experimented with return on assets (ROA) and return on capital 
employed (ROCE). The results are similar. 
4
 We have also experimented with another measure of Tobin’ Q, calculated as book value of total assets minus 
book value of equity plus market capitalization divided by book value of the firm’s assets. The estimation 
results turn out to be similar to those reported in the tables below. 
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number of executive and non-executive directors, Board Sizeit (Yermack 1996),and 
the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of directors, 
Share NEit (Mura 2007).
5 
We also investigate whether the effect of independent directors varies with the 
degree of industry similarity between the firms where these directors have their jobs. 
First, we consider the impact of appointing an independent executive director who is 
also an executive director in a firm that operates in the same industry. We argue that 
directors who work as executive directors in the same industry as that of the 
appointing firm will enhance the quality of advice offered to the appointing firm. This 
suggests that the human capital of these directors will be more beneficial than that of 
a director without such a detailed knowledge and understanding of the sector. 
However, the relationship may also be affected by competition considerations given 
that the two companies may be competitors. We define same industries based on 
two digit SIC classification. 
The second industry effect analyzed in our paper takes account of the fact that the 
human capital of an independent executive can be proxied by the performance of the 
company where the non-executive director is employed as an executive director. 
One particular issue with relating director quality to firm performance is that the latter 
may be influenced by a variety of factors beyond managerial control, such as an 
overall economic downturn or industry shock. Firm performance is therefore a very 
noisy measure of director quality. This issue is addressed in the literature by using 
relative performance indicators, which compare the performance of a company to the 
performance of firms in the same industry or market (e.g., Parrino 1997, DeFond and 
                                                          
5
We have also included lagged values of corporate governance measures as independent variables and 
received quantitatively similar results. 
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Park 1999, and Muravyev 2003). This is also the approach adopted in our study. We 
measure human capital, that is, the quality of an outside director, by the relative 
performance of the firm in which she is an executive director. 
The baseline specification therefore becomes: 
 PERFit= Xitγ + S_INDitφ + θPERF_Bit+ δt+ ξi+ εit   (2) 
where variable S_INDit is a vector of two variables Same_INDit and NOT 
SAME_INDit. Same_INDit is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at least 
one of the non-executive directors of firm i is an executive director of a company in 
the same industry and 0 otherwise. NOT SAME_INDit is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if a firm has at least one IE director, but she works in different 
industry and 0 otherwise. We define the relative performance of a firm (PERF_Bit) 
where the IED is an executive director as the difference between its reported 
performance and the median performance of all sampled firms belonging to the 
same industry and observed in the same year. This yields the following two 
hypotheses: 
H2a: IEDs recruited from the same industry in which the firm operates will have a 
positive effect on the firm’s performance. 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between the relative performance of the 
company where the director is an executive director and the performance of the firm 
where she is a non-executive director. 
Next we analyse the monitoring implications of an IED by investigating the impact on 
performance of having independent executive directors as members of the audit 
committee of the firm. The audit committee can be regarded as a proxy for the 
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monitoring function of independent directors because its main responsibilities include 
monitoring the quality of the financial statements published by the company, 
monitoring the effectiveness of the company‟s internal auditing function and 
reviewing the company‟s internal financial controls. 
The econometric model transforms into: 
PERFit= βIEit + Xitγ + S_INDitφ + θPERF_Bit+AUDITit ψ+ δt+ ξi+ εit , (3) 
where audit committee membership, AUDITit is defined as a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if an IED sits in the audit committee and 0 otherwise. The 
hypothesis is: 
H3: Having an IED on the audit committee improves performance. 
Next, we focus on the interaction of industry similarity and average relative 
performance. Industry similarity is measured based on the SIC classifications. 
Industries are categorized into six groups. The first group contains mining industries 
(codes from 10 to 14) and chemical and allied products (code 28). The second group 
consists of the manufacturing sector with SIC codes between 20 and 28. The 
remaining manufacturing firms (codes 32 to 37) constitute the third group. The fourth 
category contains retail trade services as well as transportation (codes 40 to 59). 
The fifth group consists of financial services, codes 60 to 67. The remaining 
companies (codes 70 and above) are placed in the sixth group. This produces a third 
S_IND dummy which takes the value of 1 if an IED is also an executive director in a 
company operating in a similar industry and 0 if not. The model therefore becomes: 
PERFit= βIEit + Xitγ + S_INDitφ + θPERF_Bit+AUDITxS_INDit ψ 
+PERF_BxS_INDitν+ δt+ ξi+ εit    (4) 
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The availability of industry specific human capital and the amount of human capital 
should have positive effects on the company‟s performance, in particular through the 
quality of advice provided. We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
H4: The impact of an independent executive director on performance will be positive 
if the director comes from a firm belonging to the same of similar industry. 
In relation to the interaction of industry similarity and the relative performance of a 
firm where the director is an executive director, we hypothesise a positive 
relationship given the existence of transferrable human capital. 
H5: The impact of an independent executive director on performance will be 
magnified if the director comes from a well-performing firm belonging to a similar 
industry. 
Finally, the reduction of agency problems depends crucially on the quality of 
monitoring mechanism. We aim to measure the latter by the interaction of industry 
characteristics (same or similar industries) and audit committee membership. Thus, 
we hypothesise: 
H6: The impact of an independent executive director on performance will be positive 
if the director is a member of Audit Committee and she comes from a firm belonging 
to the same or similar industry. 
 
4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data for this study have been collected from two major sources. First, financial 
data are drawn from the Extel Financial database. The advantage of the database is 
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its use of consistent financial report information across a large number of industries. 
Our initial sample contains about 5,000 UK listed companies observed between 
2002 and 2008. Second, information about executive and non-executive directors 
has been hand collected from the Corporate Register. Overall, there are about 
130,000 director-years during the seven years considered. The databases have 
been merged based on company name. While both database providers claim that 
they cover the population of listed companies, only about 50 percent of observations 
that are present in both the firm-level and director-level datasets. Our initial sample 
links around 68,000 directors with financial information of companies. 
The sample was constructed in the following way. First, we dropped all company-
years that do not report either executive or non-executive boards. Second, we 
removed all firms that report either negative equity or negative total assets. At this 
point the data consisted of about 57,000 director-company-year observations 
pertaining to 8,506 firm-years. Third, to address the issue of firms in severe financial 
distress, we have dropped companies that report ROE or ROS less than -1. Fourth, 
to reduce the effect of outliers we dropped 1% observations from the left and right 
tails of the distribution of performance and relative performance.6 Fifth, we require 
companies to have at least one executive and at least one non-executive director. 
Finally, given that we intend to make use of some lagged values in our regression 
specification, we require at least two years worth of data. The final estimation data 
set consists of about 4,020 firm-years.  
INSERT TABLE1 
                                                          
6
We have also tried winsorizing performance variables as well as applying different cut-off points for outliers 
(2% and 5% instead of 1%). In all these cases we obtained similar results. 
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Table 1 presents an overview of the variables. Among the sampled firms, the 
average board has about 6.5 directors and the average share of non-executive 
directors is 52%. This is similar to what was reported in previous studies, such as 
Weir and Laing (2003) and Guest (2008). Table 1 also shows that 21% of the 
sampled firms have non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other 
firms. On average 6% of non-executive directors are also executive directors in other 
companies, a finding consistent with Higgs (2003). This, and the other board 
structure statistics, suggests that there is no systematic selection bias in our sample.  
The performance measures of the companies from which the non-executive directors 
come are above average showing that they are good performers. For example the 
companies have, on average, two percentage points superior performance in terms 
of ROE and one percentage point superiority in terms of ROS. They also have higher 
Tobin‟s Q ratios, by 18 percentage points. The average (median) firm holds 21% 
(19%) of their total assets as long term debt. Cash to total assets represents the total 
of all cash, deposits and notes and bills in the structure of total assets. Our data 
reveal that average (median) firms maintain 10% (6%) of their assets in terms of 
cash. As expected, all firms report positive average performance during the time 
period examined. 
In relation to audit committee membership, we find that 10% of the firms have a non-
executive director who is also an executive director as a member. Although not 
reported in the table, two percent of the firms have on their audit committees a non-
executive director who is an executive director of a firm in the same industry. We 
also find that four percent of the sampled firms have someone on the audit 
committee who is an executive director in a similar industry.  
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for two subsamples: firms that have IEDs and 
those that do not. We find significant differences between the characteristics of the 
two types of firm. For example, firms with non-executive directors that are also 
executive directors in other firms use, on average, significantly more debt (24% 
relative to 20%). In terms of employment, we find that firms with non-executive 
directors are significantly bigger. They have larger boards with, on average, 8.37 
members as compared with 6.96 members in the other firms. They also have a 
significantly larger percentage of non-executive directors on the board, 57% as 
opposed to 51%. In terms of performance, ROE and ROS all show that firms that 
employ non-executive directors that are also executive directors are more profitable. 
For example, ROE is 16% for firms with IEDs and 9% for firms without IEDs. They 
also have significantly higher values of Tobin‟s Q. However, there is no difference in 
liquidity ratios. 
INSERT TABLE2 
 
5 RESULTS DISCUSSION 
 
5. 1 Baseline specifications 
The results in Table 3 show the impact of appointing an executive director as a non-
executive director on the appointing firm‟s performance, as measured by ROE, ROS, 
and Tobin‟s Q. Columns (1) - (3) show the results for the first IED measure, the 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a non-executive director who is 
also an executive director and 0 otherwise. Columns (4) - (6) report the estimates 
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when the IED variable measures the number of non-executive directors that are also 
executive directors. The results are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. 
Both ROE and ROS models show a positive and significant relationship between firm 
performance and the non-executive director affiliation measures. For example, firms 
with IEDs are likely two have one and a half standard deviations higher ROE 
compared to firms without IEDs. We also find a positive and significant relationship 
between the number of IEDs and performance. However, the Tobin‟s Q regressions 
reveal positive but statistically insignificant effects.  
INSERT TABLE3 
 
5.2 Augmented specifications 
Table 4 develops the analysis by evaluating how the effect of IEDs varies with the 
degree of industry similarity between the firms in which IEDs have jobs. The results 
in Column (1) provide evidence, at the 5% level, that having any non-executive 
directors who are also executive directors has a positive effect on the appointing 
firm‟s ROE even if this director is not from the same industry. The relationship is also 
significant if the director is from the same industry. These results suggest that the 
positive performance effects of IEDs stem from their general skills rather than from 
industry-specific skills. 
Columns (1) - (3) also contain measures of industry-relative performance of the 
company where the non-executive director is an executive director. Each 
specification includes a relative performance measure which matches the dependent 
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variable. For example, since ROE is the dependent variable in Column (1), the 
relative performance measure is also based on ROE.7  
We find a positive and significant relationship between the ROE of the appointing 
firm and the relative performance of the executive director‟s ROE. In terms of 
magnitude, a two standard deviations increase in the relative ROE of the company 
where director holds an executive position increases ROE of the appointing 
company by 0.035. This is a very substantial increase given that the average 
(median) ROE is 0.10 (0.12). We interpret this result as evidence that the appointing 
firm gains some of the director‟s human capital in the form of better quality advice. 
Thus the advantage of being responsible for effective strategies and policies as an 
executive director produces benefits in the role of non-executive director. Similar 
evidence is found in Column (2) with ROS as the dependent variable. The result is 
consistent with Chen (2008) which finds a positive relationship between a non-
executive director‟s advisory function and firm performance. These results can also 
be consistent with the findings in Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Fich (2005) 
suggesting that executives in companies that perform well are more likely to be 
appointed non-executive directors in other companies. 
The agency model emphasizes the monitoring role of non-executive directors. Chen 
(2008) argues that, by concentrating on the advisory role, monitoring will suffer and 
firms will incur agency costs. We test the monitoring role by means of membership of 
the audit committee. The responsibilities of the audit committee and its members 
have been set out in various UK reports, for example The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2003) and The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
                                                          
7
 If a company has an IED that sits on several boards as a non-executive director, the average relative 
performance measure for all of the relevant companies is calculated. 
20 
 
Audit committee members have a specific set of roles and responsibilities including 
monitoring the integrity of the company‟s financial statements, monitoring the 
effectiveness of the internal auditing systems, reviewing the company‟s internal 
financial controls and to ensure that possible financial problems are raised. These 
responsibilities should therefore result in better financial decision-making and better 
financial performance.  
The recommendation that audit committees should consist of at least three 
independent non-executive directors indicates that they are expected to undertake 
effective monitoring of the executive directors. Given the reputational issues 
involved, it is reasonable to argue that non-executive directors that are also 
executive directors will be particularly strong monitors of the board‟s actions if a 
member of the audit committee.   
Columns (4) - (6) of Table 4 report the results for audit committee membership. In 
particular, Columns (4) - (5) show that having IEDs on the audit committee has no 
effect on accounting performance as measured by ROE or ROS. Column (6) shows 
that having IEDs on the audit committee has a positive effect on market 
performance, measured by Tobin‟s Q. This is an important result because it shows 
that, within the UK context, IEDs produce positive returns on both the advisory and 
monitoring functions. The monitoring result is contrary to that of Chen (2008). The 
Chen result is based on the policies pursued by the companies where the director is 
a non-executive. However, it is argued here that the analysis of the audit committee 
membership offers a more appropriate insight into the monitoring role of an IED 
because it deals with the crucial issue of internal financial control.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
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We develop the analysis by investigating the interactions of industry similarities and 
the relative performance of the company where the IED is an executive director. We 
also analyse the interactions of industry similarities and the audit committee 
membership of IEDs. RELATIVE PERFxNOT SAME is the interaction of the industry 
adjusted profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and the 
dummy variable NOT_SAME which takes the value of 1 if the IE director comes from 
not the same industry and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE PERFxNOT SAME/NOT 
SIMILAR is the interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the company where 
the IE is an executive director and the dummy variable NOT_SIMILAR which has the 
value of 1 if the IE director comes from neither the same, nor similar, industry and 0 
otherwise. RELATIVE PERFx SIMILAR is the interaction of the industry adjusted 
profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and the dummy 
variable SIMILAR which takes the value of 1 if the IE director comes from the same 
industry and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE PERFx SAME is the interaction of the industry 
adjusted profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and 
dummy variable SAME which has the value of 1 if the IE director comes from a 
similar industry and 0 otherwise.  
In relation to audit committee membership and industry similarity, AUDITxNOT 
SAME is defined as a dummy variable which equals 1 if there are audit committee 
members that are executive directors in other companies but none work for a 
company in a similar industry and 0 otherwise. AUDITxNOT SAME/NOT SIMILAR 
has the value of 1 if there are audit committee non-executive directors who are 
executive directors in other companies, but none of them work in a company from 
the same industry or a similar group of industries and 0 otherwise. AUDITxSIMILAR 
has the value of 1 if a company has an audit committee non-executive director who 
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is also an executive director in a similar industry or 0 otherwise.  AUDITxSAME 
equals 1 if a company has a non-executive director who is an executive director in a 
company in the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
Table 5 reports the results for the regressions with these interaction terms. Columns 
(1) - (2) reveal that the interaction of the higher the relative performance of the firm 
on which the non-executive sits as an executive director and that director not being 
from the same industry will lead to better accounting performance (ROE and ROS). 
However, as column (3) shows, it does not affect Tobin‟s Q ratio. We find an 
insignificant result for the same industry measure for all three performance 
measures. This means that appointing a non-executive director who is an executive 
director for another company in the same industry does not improve performance. 
This may be explained by competition issues given that executive directors that sit 
on the boards of competitors are in a difficult position in relation to the advice they 
give. Therefore they have a conflict between their reputational interests and their 
concerns about offering a competitor some advantage. The insignificant relationship, 
however, does indicate that the IEDs do not offer poor advice.  
In relation to monitoring, we find no evidence that IEDs increase agency costs and 
hence damage performance. In terms of audit committee membership impacts, 
Table 5 shows that having independent non-executive directors from the same 
industry on the audit committee raises Tobin‟s Q but does not affect either ROE or 
ROS. These results suggest that the market regards appointing a non-executive 
director who is an executive director in the same industry as positive but that the 
benefit is not reflected in better accounting performance. 
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Columns (4) - (6) of Table 5 report the results for industry similarity interactions. The 
estimates show no significant effect for relative performance when non-executive 
directors are appointed from the same industry. This may be explained by 
competition effects, since the best executive directors are unlikely to provide 
valuable advice to competitors. Column (4) shows the interaction of industry 
similarity and higher relative profitability of the company where the IED is an 
executive director significantly improves the performance of the company where the 
director is an IED. Column (5) reports a positive relationship between ROS and a 
non-executive director working in a different industry. We also find a positive 
relationship between Q and the director being on the audit committee and being from 
the same industry. This shows effective monitoring and suggests that the market 
values that specific governance mechanism because it does not create a conflict of 
interests with the company where the IED is employed as an executive director given 
that no policies are involved. The appointing company will therefore benefit from the 
IED‟s broader expertise and human capital. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
5.3 Dynamic panel data approach 
Our models (1) – (4) are estimated using a fixed effect estimator which might not 
properly address issues of endogeneity in relation to board appointments and 
performance, Drakos and Bekiris (2010).  For example, as specified, IEDs positively 
affect the appointing firm‟s performance. However, it may be the case that high 
performing companies attract better IEDs. We address this by amending our 
baseline model (1) with a lagged dependent variable which allows us to control for 
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the potential impact of performance persistence. Our dynamic model takes the 
following form: 
PERFit= λ PERFi,t-1 +βIEit + Xitγ + δt+ ξi+ εit    (5) 
To estimate equation (5) we have to take into account the potential endogeneity of 
financial performance and board appointment decisions. Furthermore, including the 
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable makes the fixed effects 
estimator not only biased, but also inconsistent. To overcome this problem an 
instrumental variables (IV) estimator could be used. However, appropriate 
governance instruments are not easy to find. We therefore make use of the dynamic 
panel data (DPD) estimator which employs a matrix of lagged endogenous variables 
as instruments timed from t-2 to t-6. The DPD technique therefore creates 
instruments by its construction. All our models are estimated with the two-step GMM 
System (DPD) estimator, which combines equations in differences of the variables 
(instrumented by lagged levels) with equations in levels of the variables 
(instrumented by lagged differences). In addition, year dummy variables are included 
in the regressions as exogenous. 
The reliability of the DPD results depends crucially on the assumption that the 
instruments are valid. This can be checked by employing the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis that instruments are 
uncorrelated to errors would indicate inconsistent estimates. In addition, we also 
present test statistics for second-order serial correlation in the error process. In a 
dynamic panel data context, we expect first order serial correlation, but should not be 
able to detect second-order serial correlation if the instruments are orthogonal to the 
errors.  
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Table 6 reports GMM-SYS dynamic panel data results. The results are comparable 
to fixed effects estimates reported in Table 1. We find that IEDs have a positive 
effect on the appointing firm‟s performance and, in particular, the greater the number 
of IEDs, the better the appointing firm‟s performance. These results apply to all 
performance measures. All our model specifications pass the test for the second-
order autocorrelation as well as the Hansen test of the validity of the instruments.  
INSERT TABLE 6. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has explored the impact of appointing executive directors as non-
executive directors on the appointing firm‟s performance. We find that relatively few 
executive directors are appointed as non-executive directors in UK quoted firms, 
which is consistent with the Higgs Report (2003). This is despite the long-standing 
conjecture that such appointments may positively affect firm performance. 
Consistent with this view, our results suggest a positive link between the presence of 
an IED and the appointing firm‟s performance. Our data reveal that the better the 
relative performance of the firm where the director is an executive, the better the 
appointing firm‟s performance. This latter result suggests that directors‟ human 
capital matters, most likely, for the quality of advice offered by them.  
We further find some evidence that membership in the audit committee has a 
positive effect on performance. This result is consistent with a non-trivial contribution 
of IEDs to the monitoring function of corporate boards. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with the view that the appointing firm benefits from both the advisory and 
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monitoring functions of a non-executive director and suggest that appointing 
executive directors as non-executive director generates benefits for shareholders. 
The low incidence of IEDs highlighted by Higgs (2003) is therefore something that 
should be addressed given their positive effect on the performance of the appointing 
firms. 
The analysis has identified a number of areas for further research. First, the lack of a 
positive relationship between performance and appointing from the same industry 
may provide additional insights into the potential tension between advice and 
possible competition effects. Second, the distinction between types of non-executive 
directors, those already executive directors and those not, may provide a better 
understanding of the monitoring and advisory roles of non-executive directors. Third, 
the impact of social capital and its interaction with human capital may offer additional 
insights into explaining firm performance. 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Mean Sd Median N 
Leverage   0.21 0.16 0.19 3,836 
Liquidity   0.10 0.11 0.06 3,836 
Size   6.53 2.05 6.44 4,008 
Board Size 7.25 2.67 7.00 4,020 
Share NE 0.52 0.14 0.50 4,020 
IE presence            0.21 0.41 0.00 4,020 
Share of IE directors 0.06 0.14 0.00 4,020 
Number of IE directors 0.24 0.51 0.00 4,020 
ROE   0.10 0.27 0.12 3,987 
ROS   0.04 0.15 0.05 3,565 
Tobin‟s Q   0.85 0.70 0.65 3,971 
Average Relative ROE  of Exec Companies    0.02 0.31 0.00 3,997 
Average Relative ROS  of Exec Companies    0.01 0.06 0.00 3,910 
Average Relative Tobin‟s Q  of Exec Companies    0.18 0.51 0.00 3,993 
Audit  0.10 0.30 0.00 4,020 
 
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of 
number of employees. Board size is the total number of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. IE Presence is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an 
executive director of another company and 0 if not. Share of IE directors is the ratio of non-executive directors on the board that 
are also executive directors of other firms to total number of non-executive directors. Number of IE directors is the number of 
non-executive directors on a board who are executive directors in other companies. The return on equity, ROE, is defined as 
EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s 
assets.. Average Relative ROE of Exec Companies is the average profitability of the firms where the non-executive director is 
employed as an executive director. Average Relative ROS of Exec Companies is the average profitability of the firms where the 
non-executive director is employed as an executive director. Average Relative Tobin’sQ  of Exec Companies is the average Q 
ratio of the firms where the non-executive director is employed as an executive director.AUDIT as a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if an IE director sits in the audit committee and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of company characteristics of firms that have appointed 
executive directors as non-executive directors and firms that do not. 
 
 
 No IE Yes IE  
Variable Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Diff 
Leverage       0.20      0.16     3,030      0.24      0.16       806  -0.04*** 
Liquidity       0.10      0.12     3,039      0.10      0.11       797  0.00 
Size      6.31      1.99     3,178      7.38      2.04       830  -1.07*** 
Board Size     6.96      2.58     3,186      8.37      2.71       834  -1.40 *** 
Share NE     0.51      0.14     3,186      0.57      0.13       834  -0.06 *** 
ROE       0.09      0.27     3,162      0.16      0.26       825  -0.07*** 
ROS       0.03      0.16     2,818      0.06      0.13       747  -0.03*** 
Tobin‟s Q       0.84      0.69     3,153      0.89      0.72       818  -0.05** 
 
***, ** significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets divided by total assets. 
Size is the natural log of number of employees. Board size is the total number of directors on the 
board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. The return on equity, 
ROE, is defined as EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. Tobin’s Q is the market value 
of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s assets. 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression Results for the basic specification about the 
impact of non-executive directors that are also executive directors. 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board Size 0.006** 0.002 0.001 0.006** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Share NE -0.039 0.001 0.004 -0.038 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.061) (0.037) (0.110) (0.062) (0.037) (0.110) 
Lagged Leverage  -0.043 -0.079*** -0.537*** -0.041 -0.078*** -0.537*** 
 (0.065) (0.030) (0.135) (0.065) (0.030) (0.135) 
Lagged Size  -0.041*** -0.015 -0.126*** -0.041*** -0.015 -0.126*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) 
IED Presence 0.041*** 0.010* 0.006    
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.026)    
Number of IEDs     0.025** 0.009* 0.005 
    (0.011) (0.005) (0.020) 
Firm-years  4,002 3,582 3,994 4,002 3,582 3,994 
Firms  1,219 1,088 1,221 1,219 1,088 1,221 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.24 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Constant and time dummy variables are included in 
regressions but not reported. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
ROE, is defined as EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. ROS, is defined as total turnover divided by book value 
of shareholders‟ equity.  Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s assets. Board size is the total 
number of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Lagged Leverage is the 
ratio of long term debt to total assets lagged one year. Lagged Size is the natural log of number of employees lagged one year. 
IED Presence is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an executive director of another 
company and 0 if not. Number of IEDs is the number of non-executive directors on a board who are executive directors in other 
companies.  
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression Results: Specifications with relative performance, 
audit committee membership and industry similarities. 
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board Size 0.006** 0.002 0.001 0.006** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Share NE -0.047 0.001 -0.019 -0.044 0.002 -0.036 
 (0.061) (0.038) (0.109) (0.062) (0.039) (0.110) 
Lagged Leverage  -0.048 -0.082*** -0.536*** -0.053 -0.085*** -0.555*** 
 (0.065) (0.030) (0.134) (0.065) (0.031) (0.135) 
Lagged Size  -0.041*** -0.014 -0.124*** -0.040*** -0.014 -0.127*** 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) 
IED X not same 0.032** 0.000 -0.026 0.030 -0.000 -0.056 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.040) (0.019) (0.010) (0.038) 
IED X same 0.054* 0.022 0.017 0.049 0.021 -0.016 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.064) (0.034) (0.017) (0.066) 
RelPerf 0.035*** 0.116*** 0.024 0.051* 0.112** 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.043) (0.032) (0.030) (0.048) (0.027) 
AuditxIED    -0.003 0.002 0.073* 
    (0.020) (0.009) (0.040) 
Firm-years  3,980 3,502 3,967 3,980 3,502 3,967 
Firms  1,219 1,072 1,221 1,219 1,072 1,221 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Constant and time dummy variables are included in 
the regressions but not reported.  
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.   
ROE, is defined as EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. ROS, is defined as total turnover divided by book value 
of shareholders‟ equity. Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s assets. Board size is the total 
number of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Lagged Leverage is the 
ratio of long term debt to total assets lagged one year. Lagged Size is the natural log of number of employees lagged one year. 
IE Presence is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an executive director of another 
company and 0 if not. Number of IE directors is the number of non-executive directors on a board who are executive directors 
in other companies.IED X NOT SAME is a dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has at least one IED who works in different 
industry and 0 otherwise. IED X SAME is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at least one of non-executive directors 
of firm ihas an executive position in the same industry and 0 if not. RelPerfis the average performance of the companies in 
which the non-executive director acts as an executive director. Audit X IE is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
there is an IED on the audit committee and 0 if not 
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression Results: Specifications with relative performance, 
industry similarities and IE interactions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IE Not Same Industry  0.033* 0.001 -0.017    
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.037)    
IE Not Same/Not Similar     0.040** -0.000 -0.019 
    (0.020) (0.010) (0.040) 
IE Similar Industry    -0.004 0.002 0.027 
    (0.026) (0.016) (0.075) 
IE Same Industry 0.053 0.011 -0.131 0.051 0.011 -0.128 
 (0.039) (0.015) (0.099) (0.038) (0.015) (0.099) 
Relative Perf X Not Same 0.041*** 0.151*** 0.005    
 (0.011) (0.053) (0.032)    
Relative Perf X Not     0.032 0.145** 0.010 
Same/Not Similar    (0.024) (0.059) (0.036) 
Relative Perf X Similar    0.047*** 0.158 -0.012 
    (0.005) (0.109) (0.062) 
Relative Perf X Same 0.015 -0.027 0.102 0.015 -0.028 0.101 
 (0.011) (0.081) (0.095) (0.011) (0.080) (0.095) 
Audit X Not Same Industry -0.006 -0.005 0.021    
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.047)    
Audit X Not Same/Not Similar     -0.010 -0.005 0.003 
    (0.023) (0.011) (0.054) 
Audit X Similar Industry    0.051 0.011 0.008 
    (0.036) (0.013) (0.053) 
Audit X Same Industry 0.005 0.028 0.166** 0.001 0.027 0.160** 
 (0.040) (0.022) (0.071) (0.039) (0.022) (0.071) 
Firm-years  3,980 3,502 3,967 3,980 3,502 3,967 
Firms  1,219 1,072 1,221 1,219 1,072 1,221 
R2  0.07 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.24 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Constant and time dummy, board size, share of 
non-executive directors, lagged leverage and lagged SIZE variables are included in 
specification but not reported. * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
ROE, is defined as EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. ROS, is defined as total turnover divided by book value 
of shareholders‟ equity. Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s assets. IE NOT SAME 
INDUSTRY takes the value of 1 if the IE director is not an executive director in the same industry and 0 otherwise. IE NOT 
SAME/NOT SIMILAR is 1 if the IE director is not an executive director in the same or similar industry and 0 otherwise. IE 
SIMILAR is 1 if the IE director is an executive director in a company in a similar industry and 0 otherwise. IESAME is 1 if the IE 
director is also an executive director in a company in the same industry and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE PERFxNOT SAME is the 
interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and the IE director coming 
from not the same industry and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE PERFxNOT SAME/NOT SIMILAR is the interaction of the industry 
adjusted profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and the IE director coming from neither the same nor 
similar industry, and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE PERFx SIMILAR is the interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the 
company where the IE is an executive director and the IE director coming from the same industry and 0 otherwise. RELATIVE 
PERFx SAME  is the interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the company where the IE is an executive director and 
the IE director coming from a similar industry and 0 otherwise. AUDITxNOT SAME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there 
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are audit committee members that are executive directors in other companies but none work for a company in a similar industry 
and 0 otherwise. AUDITxNOT SAME/NOT SIMILAR has the value of 1 if there are audit committee non-executive directors who 
are executive in other companies, but none of them work in a company from the same industry or a similar group of industries 
and 0 otherwise. AUDITxSIMILAR has the value of 1 if a company has an audit committee non-executive director who is also 
an executive director in a similar industry or 0 otherwise.  AUDITxSAME, is 1 if a company has a non-executive director who is 
an executive director in a company in the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6: GMM-SYS Dynamic Panel Data Regressions Results.  
 
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobin‟s 
Q 
ROE ROS Tobin‟s 
Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IE presence 0.060** 0.051*** 0.186***    
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.071)    
Number of IE directors    0.041* 0.043** 0.144** 
    (0.024) (0.017) (0.061) 
Boardsize 0.006 0.000 0.014** 0.005 0.001 0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Share NE 0.041 0.011 0.284 0.059 0.019 0.326 
 (0.107) (0.094) (0.324) (0.109) (0.096) (0.329) 
Leverage -0.359*** -0.134 -0.216 -0.343** -0.125 -0.259 
 (0.137) (0.097) (0.384) (0.136) (0.099) (0.385) 
Log(Labour) 0.030* 0.013 -0.131** 0.033** 0.011 -0.134** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.053) (0.016) (0.019) (0.055) 
Lagged performance 0.330*** 0.282* 0.276*** 0.327*** 0.296* 0.284*** 
 (0.080) (0.167) (0.103) (0.081) (0.164) (0.105) 
Firm-years           3,968 3,549 3,956 3,968 3,549 3,956 
Firms                1,211 1,078 1,212 1,211 1,078 1,212 
Hansen (p-value) 0.15 0.45 0.30 0.16 0.42 0.23 
AR2 (p-value 0.76 0.54 0.39 0.80 0.56 0.40 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Constant and time dummy variables are included in 
the regressions but not reported.  
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
ROE, is defined as EBIT divided by book value of shareholders‟ equity. ROS, is defined as total turnover divided by book value 
of shareholders‟ equity.  Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm‟s assets. Board size is the total 
number of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Lagged Leverage is the 
ratio of long term debt to total assets lagged one year. Lagged Size is the natural log of number of employees lagged one year. 
IE Presence is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an executive director of another 
company and 0 if not. Number of IE directors is the number of non-executive directors on a board who are executive directors 
in other companies.  
 
